| ASSETS | Amount (T VED) | % of Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Foreign Exchange Assets | 1,424.1 | ~100% | |
| Monetary Gold (~53 tonnes) | ~598.0 | 42.0% | |
| SDR Holdings (IMF) | ~598.0 | 42.0% | |
| Foreign Bank Deposits | ~170.9 | 12.0% | |
| Other Foreign Assets | ~57.0 | 4.0% | |
| Domestic Assets | --- | ||
| Government Securities (PDVSA/Republic bonds) | Est. significant | --- | |
| Loans to Public Sector | Est. very large | --- | |
| Other Domestic Assets | --- | --- | |
| LIABILITIES & EQUITY | Amount (T VED) | % of Total | |
| Monetary Liabilities | |||
| Currency in Circulation (Monetary Base) | ~179.5* | --- | |
| Bank Reserves at BCV | --- | --- | |
| Foreign Exchange Liabilities | 1,182.1 | --- | |
| Government FX Deposits | --- | --- | |
| SDR Allocations (IMF) | --- | --- | |
| Other FX Liabilities | --- | --- | |
| Other Liabilities | |||
| Securities Issued (BCV bonds) | --- | --- | |
| TOTAL EQUITY | 13.4 | ~0.9% | |
Brazil tried 5 failed stabilization plans before the Real Plan worked. The genius was understanding that Brazilian hyperinflation was inertial — contracts, wages, and prices were automatically indexed to past inflation, creating a self-fulfilling spiral. Instead of freezing prices (which failed every time), the architects created the URV (Unidade Real de Valor) — a virtual unit of account indexed to the dollar — that gradually replaced the cruzeiro in people's minds before the currency swap even happened. By the time the Real was introduced on July 1, 1994, inflation expectations were already broken.
| Plan | Year | Method | Initial Result | Why It Failed | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cruzado Plan | Feb 1986 | Price/wage freeze + new currency (1:1000) | 0% inflation for 3 months | No fiscal adjustment; wages rose 20-30%; public spending at 8% GDP deficit | 300%+ by 1987 |
| Bresser Plan | Jun 1987 | Price freeze + partial wage indexation | Single-digit monthly briefly | Fiscal targets missed; no credibility after Cruzado failure | 1,000%+ by 1988 |
| Verao Plan | Jan 1989 | Price freeze + new currency (cruzado novo) | Brief deceleration | Same formula as Cruzado; population no longer believed freezes | 1,783% by end 1989 |
| Collor Plan I | Mar 1990 | Confiscated 80% of bank deposits + price freeze | 84%/mo to 3%/mo in one month | Massive GDP contraction (-4.3%); destroyed trust in banking system forever | 2,948% in 1990 |
| Collor Plan II | Jan 1991 | Interest rate freeze + financial reforms | Temporary slowdown | Political crisis; Collor impeached for corruption; no credibility | 2,000%+ by 1993 |
| Plano Real | Jul 1994 | URV unit of account + fiscal fund + gradual transition | 50.7% to 0.96%/mo in 3 months | N/A — IT WORKED | Permanent success |
| Characteristic | Brazil URV (1994) | Venezuela USDT (2025) | Parallel |
|---|---|---|---|
| Function | Stable unit of account indexed to USD | USD-pegged stablecoin on blockchain | Identical |
| Adoption | 70% of prices in URV within 4 months | 34% of retail in stablecoins, 80% of crypto = USDT | Similar pace |
| Government role | Government-designed and mandated | Organic, bottom-up adoption despite government | Inverted |
| Settlement | Pay in cruzeiros, price in URV | Pay in USDT/Bs hybrid, price in USD equivalent | Functionally same |
| Inertia breaking | Deliberately designed to break indexation | Accidentally breaking it — people think in dollars | Same effect |
| Transition to new currency | URV → Real on July 1, 1994 | USDT → Formal dollarization or new currency? | Awaiting policy |
Venezuela is the world's first country where stablecoins are organically replacing the national currency at scale. USDT accounts for 80% of all crypto activity. PDVSA settles ~$12B/yr in oil exports via USDT. 34% of retail transactions use stablecoins. 60% of Venezuelans lack bank access — stablecoins ARE the banking system. This is the digital version of Brazil's URV: the population has already shifted its unit of account to a dollar-pegged instrument. The government can either fight this (and lose) or formalize it as the foundation of a new monetary framework.
| Factor | Traditional Dollarization (Ecuador model) | Stablecoin-Based Dollarization | Advantage |
|---|---|---|---|
| Physical cash needed | Requires $5-10B in physical USD bills to circulate | Zero — digital wallets on smartphones | Stablecoin |
| Sanctions risk | USD transactions can be blocked by US Treasury/SWIFT | P2P stablecoins harder to sanction; USDT = offshore USD | Stablecoin |
| Banking infrastructure | Requires functioning banks (60% unbanked in VZ) | Smartphone = bank. 38% already use P2P crypto | Stablecoin |
| Transparency | Central bank reports (BCV has hidden data for years) | On-chain reserves visible to everyone in real-time | Stablecoin |
| Speed of adoption | 12-24 months for full transition | Already happening — 34% of retail, 80% of crypto | Stablecoin |
| Remittances | Western Union fees 10-50% | USDT transfer costs <$1, settles in minutes | Stablecoin |
| Government manipulation | CB can be pressured to break the peg (Argentina 2001) | Smart contracts enforce rules — no human override | Stablecoin |
| Monetary sovereignty | Fully surrendered to the US Fed | Can create sovereign stablecoin backed by basket (Path B/C) | Depends on path |
Venezuela already tried a government cryptocurrency: the Petro (2018). It failed catastrophically because it was: (1) not actually backed by oil despite claims, (2) not transparent — no proof of reserves, no open blockchain, (3) forced on people via decree rather than adopted voluntarily, (4) used to circumvent sanctions rather than to stabilize the economy. The key insight: a government stablecoin ONLY works if it's (a) transparently backed 1:1 by real assets that anyone can audit, (b) adopted voluntarily, and (c) designed to stabilize, not to circumvent constraints. USDT succeeds where the Petro failed precisely because no government controls it.
Based on successful stabilizations in Israel (1985), Brazil (1994 Plano Real), Ecuador (2000 dollarization), and Argentina (2024 Milei), this strategy adapts proven mechanisms to Venezuela's unique conditions — plus the stablecoin revolution that gives Venezuela a tool no previous country had. USDT is already Venezuela's de facto URV: 80% of crypto, 34% of retail, $12B in PDVSA settlements. The key insight: hyperinflation is always a fiscal problem wearing a monetary disguise. Fix the fiscal root, then use stablecoins as the credible monetary anchor.
No stabilization program in history has succeeded without political commitment. Israel's 1985 plan worked because the government, Histadrut (labor), and business all agreed to sacrifice. Argentina's Convertibility worked for a decade because Menem committed fully. Ecuador's dollarization worked because it was irreversible. Venezuela's program requires: (1) genuine political will to stop using the BCV as a piggy bank, (2) willingness to accept short-term GDP contraction of 5-10% during stabilization, (3) international support conditional on real reform. Without these, no technical solution can work — the BCV's balance sheet is merely the symptom. The disease is fiscal and institutional.
| Country | Year | Peak Inflation | Method | Key Action | Time to <10% | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Germany | 1923 | 29,500%/mo | New currency (Rentenmark) | Backed by land/industrial assets, strict money supply cap | ~2 months | Success |
| Israel | 1985 | 450%/yr | Heterodox shock | Fiscal cut + price/wage freeze + US aid + CB independence | ~12 months | Success |
| Bolivia | 1985 | 23,000%/yr | Orthodox shock (Sachs plan) | Fiscal austerity + unified FX rate + tin mine closures | ~3 months | Success |
| Argentina | 1991 | 3,000%/yr | Currency board | 1:1 peso-dollar peg, full reserve backing, privatizations | ~6 months | 10yr then collapse |
| Brazil | 1994 | 2,500%/yr | Plano Real (URV) | Virtual USD-indexed unit of account → gradual price migration → currency swap. No freeze. Fiscal adjustment first. 50.7%/mo → 0.96% in 90 days | ~3 months | Gold standard |
| Ecuador | 2000 | 96%/yr | Full dollarization | Adopted USD as sole legal tender, eliminated CB money creation | ~18 months | Success |
| Zimbabwe | 2009 | 79.6B%/mo | Multi-currency / dollarization | Abandoned ZWD, adopted USD/ZAR as legal tender | ~1 month | Partial (re-inflated 2019) |
| Argentina | 2024-25 | 290%/yr | Milei shock / crawling peg | Fiscal surplus, deregulation, 50% devaluation, spending cuts | ~10 months | In progress - working |
| Venezuela | 2025-26 | 238-548%/yr | TBD | Requires all of the above: fiscal + monetary + structural | Est. 6-18 mo | Not yet started |